Anyway, as I was doing my usual post-season review of my game log scripts, I got interested in the idea of whether I might be able to determine the existence, if not the strength, of infield shifting.
Now, before we get going too far, there are some problems that I just can’t get around, not the least of which is that the game never tells you a shift is on or not. Beyond that, we all know our managers and strategy bars have settings that are (oh, so helpfully) labeled simply how more or less often from “average” a manager is supposed to do anything. Of course, that leaves the question of “what is average, and could that average be even zero?”
Who knows, right? And that’s before we even get into whether a shift has actual value.
So, yeah, we’re really just flying blind.
I can, however do something perhaps at least a little interesting. My script identifies what fielder made a play, and in what zone that play was made in. So, my brain figured, if I could—for example—pull out plays made on ground balls by shortstops in zones normally patrolled by second basemen (in zones 4 and 4M, for example), then it might make sense these were due to a shift. Similarly, for third basemen and shortstops. If a third baseman makes a play in a zone that’s home to the shortstop, one might assume a shift was in play.
So, that’s what I’ve done.
I went back to 2043 and 2044 data to look at how many times these things happened.
Here’s the result:
Really interesting, right?
I mean…my first cut here is that our teams employ the shift against left-handed batters more often than RHB. I say this because the 3B and SS shifting into rightward zones seem to get their gloves on more balls than 2B moving leftward. I’m not sure this is really quite right, of course—it could well be than shortstops are ranging far into second base zones all on their own more than I’d expet—but the data seems to say that. The data also seems to say that there are at least some shifts happening against RHB.
That’s a problem with my approach, really. Shortstops, for example, already get to balls in the hole (56 zones), so I have no way to tell how many were due to the shift that direction. Same with third basemen and guarding the line. All I can say for sure is that despite there being more RHB than LHB, second basemen get fewer ground balls in shortstop zones than shortstops get in 2B zones.
LET’S LOOK AT SOME INDIVIDUAL TEAMS
Here’s where we get to a lot of what we don’t’ know—meaning strategy and manager settings. And how much infield range might really mean.
That said, I scanned a few numbers and checked out some mangers.
For example, let’s look at Wichita (El Paso), who had only six occurrences of players fielding balls outside their zones—the league’s “worst” performance. Manager Rushd Ercan is rated “Below Average” for calling the shift. Or Brooklyn, who had twelve 14 occurrences of fielders getting to balls outside their zones. Manager Tomas Valdez is also rated “Below Average” in use of the shift. Hawaii’s Ricardo Morales—rated “Neutral—also only saw his team make 12 such plays all year.
On the other side of the coin, we see Charlotte 41 such occasions. The Cougars manager is Tom Chambers, and Chambers is listed as “Above Average” in his use of the shift. Of course, Chambers was their manager last season, and the team only pulled off fifteen of these events. Likewise, Edmonton’s Juan Carlos Gonzalez is listed as using the shift with “High Frequency.” His team gathered forty such plays—one less than Charlotte. Like Charlotte’s case, the team’s performance in 2043 was substantially less, though.
So?
Hand-picking a few values suggests manager ratings probably make a difference, but, really I dunno.
Two-Year Totals
I looked at Yellow Springs’s manager (Sam Brewington) and note that he’s also considered to use the shift with “High Frequency” (relative to … ). Neither season did the Nine score particularly high in plays out of zone.
When I combined the two years, though, Brewington sits toward the top of the pile, with 56 events (tied with Charlotte for fourth highest.
Long Beach is third—though their manager (Gabriel Rodriguez) is “Neutral” regarding the shift.
Of course, this brings up a couple more questions. First, I note that the two-season approach gets messy because some managers (Brewington) were in place both seasons, and others (Rodriguez) are newcomers. Another issue might well be Run Differential and what it means to game situation. It would make sense that managers are more likely to call shifts into play when games are tighter. The Nine played to a run differential of 314, the Surfers 154. How much does this matter? I have no clues, but it’s interesting.
Going toward the bottom of the list shows us Wichita again, which makes sense, but also Phoenix. John Yates has been at the helm in the land of melting asphalt for both seasons. He’s noted as being “Below Average” in his use of shifts.
What Does It All Mean?
Well, if you haven’t heard this y eat, the answer is “I don’t know.”
At the end of the day, whether a shift even helps win is, again, unclear, but I’d suggest these indirect measures suggest that the infield shift does come into play for the BAA, and that the manager rating seems to influence things to a “measurable” degree. This makes me assume that your hidden slider strategy sliders make a difference, too. Of course, the question about whether the shift is saving runs is a matter of difference—as in what would the results of all these balls be if there was no shift? Or—how well are our managers deploying the strategy? In what situations are shifts enacted, and in which are they not? Does the quality of the infielder make a difference (how could it not?). How dos the strategy interact with hitter types (Pull vs. Spray?), and could that be something that impacts the overall numbers?
The questions are about endless, really.
Like most of these studies, learning one thing opens up the can of worms for a couple dozen more questions to raise their head.
That, I suppose, is why we play the game. And that, I suppose, is why my quest to understand anything real about OOTP defense is likely to be a lifelong challenge.
